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Abstract: The aim of the article is to compare several rating systems used by 
banks and their affiliates, especially in German-speaking countries. The research is 
focused on the rating of business entities, more precisely the corporate ones, 
(especially limited liability companies or joint-stock companies). In particular, two 
aspects of the rating of the corporations are highlighted in the rating system 
comparison, namely: (i) which quantitative indicators are used for the calculation 
of the hard-facts and (ii) how the soft-facts are included in the rating system.  The 
result of the research shows, that concerning the quantitative indicators (i), the 
highest emphasis is put on the capital structure of an enterprise (whether in the 
form of Equity to Liabilities or Equity to Total assets) in all compared rating systems. 
Concerning the other indicators used for the calculation, the monitored rating 
systems are different, and the total number of indicators also differs (from 6 to 9). 
For soft-facts (ii) all rating systems agree on some of the queries (e.g. the 
sensitivity of the rated entity to market fluctuations), but otherwise the number 
and the topics of the queries overlap only partially. 
Keywords: hard-facts, rating, risk management, soft-facts 
JEL codes: G11, G21, G24, G32 
Introduction 
Internal rating systems are currently an integral part of the risk management 
system of banks and non-banking financial institutions. In addition to the original 
purpose, which is the assessment of clients' creditworthiness, they also play an 
irreplaceable role in determining the capital adequacy of banks in compliance with 
the Basel II accord and the emerging Basel III accord respectively. For more 
information about the Basel accords please refer to Basel II (2006) or BIS (2010). 
This article deals with the comparison of the internal rating systems used currently 
and / or in the recent past by three banks or banking groups originating from the 
German-speaking economic environment and regions. All the banks mentioned 
apply the IRB Approach for Basel II and use their rating tools to assess the credit 
risk of their clients, expressed in the PD (probability of Default).  
As the issue of rating systems is quite extensive, I focus only on selected matters 
of the rating systems mentioned here, namely: (i) which quantitative indicators are 
used for the calculation of the hard-facts (quantitative analysis based on data from 
reports, especially balance sheets and profit and loss accounts); and (ii) how the 
soft-facts are included in the rating system (qualitative indicators usually based on 
a questionnaire or interview). 
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1 Review of Literature 
A similar topic, but from different point of view was studied by Bakhtiari (2017). 
His paper focuses on the Standard and Poor's (S & P) credit rating of firms in the 
USA. Bakhtiari tried to find positive or negative correlation between the credit rating 
and productivity of companies. The findings of the paper point to size as to one 
major balancing factor for a good rating result. With a focus on manufacturing, the 
evidence points to two types of companies getting an investment grade rating: (i) 
medium-sized productive firms (firms “driving the creative destruction” according 
to Bakhtiari) and (ii) very large but not so productive firms (too-big-to-fail and 
“resisting the creative destruction”). The Bakhtiari’s results suggest that the 
substitutability of size and productivity in the ratings system is not recent and has 
been around for a long time. In this context, the effort to find the most important 
factors for the rating results and the potential change of the weights of these factors 
with size of the rated company makes sense. The size of the rated company (bank's 
client) and its importance for the rating result is one of the topics I deal with in this 
paper.     
Jankowitsch, Pichler and Schwaiger (2007) analyze the potential economic value of 
improving the credit rating system. They show, that an investment in the rating 
system can bring not only a reduction in Basel's required capital held in the bank 
but also a reduction in credit losses by increasing the annual rate of return by 30–
40 bps. Their results demonstrate "the significant potential economic value to a 
lender of better rating systems because these ratings allow the banks to price loans 
more effectively." It is questionable, how far can the banks in high-competitive 
environment on current market really adjust the prices of their loans by risk - since 
2007, many things have changed, especially because of the financial crisis. But the 
more effective rating system and the following better risk evaluation is surely an 
advantage by all means and in any environment, as stated e.g. by Spuchľáková, 
Valašková, Adamko (2015): "The effective management of credit risk is a critical 
component of a comprehensive approach to risk management and essential to the 
long-term success of any banking organization." 
One of the most recent as well as geographically closest researches about credit 
rating is the work of Weissova, Kollar and Siekelova (2015), who deal with the 
situation in Slovakia. Their paper shows very similar structuring of the rating 
system(s) to hard- and soft-facts (see below), but they do not deal with more 
detailed analysis of the indictors used in these categories. 
Berg and Koziol (2017) in their paper, covering 40 banks and 17,000 corporate 
borrowers from 2008–2012 in Germany, found three main results, related to banks’ 
rating systems and their results. (i) First, the variability of PD estimates for the 
same borrower across banks is large. (ii) Second, bank fixed effects explain 5% of 
the variation in PD estimates across banks, while 95% of the variation is 
idiosyncratic (non-systematic and thus not affecting capital requirements). (iii) 
Third, there are various bank characteristics that explain the size of bank fixed 
effects, like that weaker-capitalized banks on average report lower PD estimates 
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and that banks’ reported PD estimates increase after significant capital increases. 
But as the authors emphasize, their results should be interpreted with care. 
For the basic overview and historical background about credit rating agencies (I 
mention the agencies as source for external ratings in point 3.2 and use the Moody’s 
scale for comparison in point 3.5) the paper of Jeon and Lovo (2013) can be 
recommended.  
Danielsson (2002) and Danielsson, Song Shin and Zigrand (2004) show on the 
example of market risk and value-at-risk models (VaR), that if many players on the 
same market use the same or similar risk models, it could have very negative 
consequences. If many market participants apply the same or very similar strategy 
at the same time, it can make the fluctuation bigger and the situation worse. 
Although this study covers market risk and value-at-risk models, the degree of 
similarity can be an interesting question in different types of models too.  
The most authors mentioned above use more statistical point of view, thus they 
usually do not analyze the internal structure of the rating systems / tools. I try to 
answer the question, how far the credit risk models (banks’ internal rating models) 
are similar and what are the most important factors of rating results, with 
awareness of limits of available data (regarding the region, the number of 
monitored banks etc). 
Fracassi, Petry and Tate (2016) were concerned with interesting question of how 
rating analyst subjectivity affects corporate debt pricing. In my paper, I can only 
briefly mention the soft-facts part of the rating systems (where there is the only 
potential space for rating analyst subjectivity), but I see this topic as possible 
direction for future studies. 
2 Data and Methodology 
For comparison, documentation to the three rating systems used by three different 
banks (banking groups) from the German-speaking environment was available. The 
data from years 2004 up to 2016 were used, where the most important documents 
(rating manuals, scales etc.) are dated 2004, 2008, 2011 and 2016. 
Since some of these documents are confidential and have not been granted full 
disclosure, the results of the investigations are limited in some respects. It is also 
not possible to publish the names of the mentioned banks (banking groups). The 
data are anonymised accordingly, but this is done in a way which does not affect 
their value to the research. These three banking institutions and their rating 
systems are listed under A, B and C. Due to the sensitivity of both client and own 
bank data, it was not possible to obtain more detailed information or even 
numerical data on outputs of rating systems. Therefore, the paper is more focused 
on the comparison of the rating methods and rating systems, not on numerical 
results. 
In all cases, the rating tools are used in a form of a software tool for Microsoft 
Windows OS. The empirical data was collected and assessed according to the 
64 
criteria of verifiability and relevance. Subsequently, the induction method was 
applied and conclusions were generalised. 
3 Results and Discussion 
3.1 Scopes of Rating Systems 
The research is focused on the rating of business entities, more precisely corporate, 
(especially limited liability companies or joint-stock companies). It does not take 
into account the rating of natural persons or non-profit organizations, municipalities 
etc.  
Nevertheless, the criteria and limits for the decision, which module (or rating tool 
included in the rating system) should be used for particular client, are not such 
simple and differ from bank to bank slightly. 
Bank A uses two criteria for the enterprise entities, as the Table 1 shows: (i) 
operating revenue (consolidated, if applicable) and (ii) group exposure (according 
to Basel II rules, which means total of all credit lines without term loans plus original 
amount of outstanding term loans plus account balances exceeding credit lines). 
For (i) operating revenue the limit is set to EUR 50 million, for (ii) group exposure 
to EUR 1 million. If the client exceeds at least one of the limits, the bank uses the 
Corporate rating tool for him. If not, the Retail rating / Scoring tool is used, as the 
following table shows.        
Table 1 The bank A criteria for decision between Retail / Scoring  
and Corporate rating tools 
  
Consolidated operating revenue 
≤EUR 50 million > EUR 50 million 
Group 
exposure 
≤ EUR 1 million Retail / Scoring Corporate rating 
> EUR 1 million Corporate rating Corporate rating 
Source: Author by using bank “A” rating manual 
Besides these rules, for some other types of enterprises the Corporate rating tool 
is used automatically, regardless of the quantitative criteria mentioned above. This 
is the case for holding companies, real estate private (except for non-reporting 
companies), non-profit housing construction companies, insurance companies, 
political parties and non-banking financial institutions. By contrast, for the banks 
there is a different special rating tool.  
Bank B does not use quantitative criteria for the decision of using the corporate 
rating tool. The rating in Corporate tool should be always based on audited financial 
statements or at least on data with "certified expert's confirmation of conformity". 
Special different tool is used for financial companies like banks, leasing companies, 
insurance companies etc.    
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Bank C does not use the quantitative criteria either, but its rating system has more 
different tools, designed for particular groups of clients like start-ups (new 
companies with no full year financial results), real estate companies / projects and 
financial companies (banks, insurance companies). The request for audited 
financial statements for the Corporate rating tool is set, too. 
3.2 Basic Structure of Rating Systems 
The basic structure of all the three rating systems mentioned is quite similar. All 
three compared rating systems first produce the part of the rating, based on clients’ 
financial statements (financial data). After possible other inputs like sector data, 
budgets etc., the financial statement rating becomes quantitative or hard-facts 
(HF) rating, as one of the two main sources for the final result. The second source 
is the qualitative or soft-facts (SF) rating, based on qualitative criteria, where 
usually the key account manager provides most of the information used (for details 
of the quantitative and qualitative indicators used see below - points 3.3 and 3.4). 
In the next stage, the hard-facts rating and the soft-facts rating are integrated 
together, according to a given weighting formula. This formula differs slightly at 
the compared rating tools, reaching from 66 : 34 (HF : SF) up to 50 : 50. Two 
rating systems (banks A and B) use fix weights for all their corporate clients, the 
rating system of the bank C is more complex, with the weights varying with a 
change of the size of the rated company. The more turnover the rated company 
makes; the more weight the hard-facts have in the final rating. This is a logical 
solution: smaller companies are more endangered by one person’s mistakes or loss 
(like death of the owner / CEO in one person), their processes (like accounting etc.) 
are usually less intensively checked by internal and external audits etc. The weights 
in the bank's C system start with the 50 : 50 ratio for companies with annual 
turnover under EUR 1 million and continue with increasing importance of 
quantitative (hard-facts) indicators up to 66 (HF) : 34 (SF) ratio for companies with 
turnover over EUR 75 million a year. Using the weights, the hard-facts rating and 
the soft-facts rating result together in an automatically calculated or stand-
alone rating. From this point on, the rating systems start to differ. 
Bank A considers first the age of the financial statements, used for the calculation. 
If they are older than 18 or 21 months respectively (closing day of the latest 
financial statement), the rating is downgraded by two or three grades respectively. 
If the dates are older than 24 months, the rating is automatically downgraded to 
grade 7 (the worst non-default grade). After this step, the rating becomes 
Recommended rating. 
 It has to be mentioned, that the other two banks (B and C) take the age of the 
financial statements in consideration too, but in different ways. The bank's B 
system just does not allow to make a rating from financial statements older than 3 
years. In case the statements are between 2 and 3 years, the system shows a 
notice, but does not change the rating result. For the bank C, the financial 
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statements older than 21 months are one of the risk factors, considered in the 
rating process (see below).            
Next step in the bank's A rating system are the possible downgrades due to 
negative information like high dependency on suppliers and / or customers, high 
write-downs, negative business prospects etc. This information can make the rating 
worse by several grades or downgrade it directly to the grade 7.  
The last possible change of the rating comes with up- / downgrading or even 
overruling of the client's rating by using the external credit rating (made by one of 
respected agencies) or group's, mother's or guarantor's rating - the particular rules 
are given. When this last step is made or skipped, the rating becomes Final 
customer’s rating. The basic structure of the bank A rating system is shown 
Figure 1.    
Figure 1 The basic structure of the bank A rating system 
 
 
Source: Author's illustration based on Bank A rating manual 
In the case of bank B, the external rating could be used too, but only if the 
customer's shares are traded on stock exchange. In such a case, the external rating 
influences the hard-facts rating.   
In following steps, the basic structure of the rating system is similar to bank A, 
except that the possible up- / downgrades are made just in one step, making Stand 
- alone rating to Final customer’s rating. The basic structure of the bank B 
rating system in shown Figure 2.   
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Figure 2 The basic structure of the bank B rating system 
 
Source: Author's illustration based on Bank B rating manual 
The bank C uses the variable weighting formula for hard- and soft-fact (as 
mentioned above), in following steps there is one interesting difference between 
banks A and B. Generally, the possible manual down- or upgrades in ratings (in all 
monitored banks A, B and C) can be made either by any person of the risk 
management team with the supervision of team head or can be made by chosen 
person(s) only. The four eye principle (maker - checker) is always kept. But only 
in the bank's C rating system, after the Automatically calculated rating is made, 
the relationship manager / salesman has the opportunity to manually downgrade 
the rating by selecting the risk factors / warning signals. There is no way for the 
relationship manager / salesman to upgrade the rating and any change has to be 
approved by a member of risk management. The possible reasons for downgrade 
can be for example the age of the financial statement (more than 21 months), high 
amount of doubtful receivables (not noticed in the financial statements, but known 
to the bank), restructuring non-trustworthy financial statements etc. Obviously the 
idea is that the salesperson knows the client better because of the personal contacts 
and visits than a risk manager does.   
Then follows the possible correction of the rating by risk management and possible 
overruling by mother company's rating. The result is the Final customer’s rating. 
The basic structure of the bank C rating system is shown the Figure 3. 
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Figure 3 The basic structure of the bank C rating system 
 
 
Source: Author's illustration based on Bank C rating manual 
3.3 Quantitative Indicators (Hard-facts) 
For comparison of quantitative as well as qualitative indicators, the overview 
scheme including all three rating systems was made by author of this paper. In 
some cases, the weight applies for two or three indicators together, which is 
represented by the merged and centered particular column in the scheme. Please 
note that the numbers of weights are rounded. 
As the Table 2 shows, regarding the quantitative indicators (hard-facts), the highest 
emphasis is put on the Capital structure of the rated company. This applies to all 
three rating systems compared, whether in the form of Equity to Liabilities or Equity 
to Total assets. Two rating systems pair the Equity ratio with other one or two ratios 
respectively, concerning Liabilities. 
There are three other categories of quantitative indicators (hard facts), used in 
specific form in all three rating systems. These indicators are (i) Cash Flow to 
Liabilities (in two cases together with Income to Interest in slightly different form), 
(ii) Profit to Sales (in one case together with Profit to Total Assets) and (iii) Trade 
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payables and Notes payable to Sales; all these indicators have important, but lower 
weight than the capital structure of the company. 
Table 2 Quantitative indicators (hard facts)  
 
Note: The numbers of weights are rounded. 
Source: Author' illustration based on banks “A”, “B” and “C” rating manuals. 
In two cases, the indicators for Growth and for Liquidity are used, in slightly 
different forms. For the rating system B, where the most indicators (nine) occur, 
the unique one measures Personnel expenses against Sales with 10% weight 
(rounded).   
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3.4 Qualitative Indicators (Soft-facts) 
The Comparison of qualitative (soft-facts) indicators is made by high-level 
categories, because of keeping the scheme uncluttered. The extent of this paper 
does not allow to perform a deeper analysis of this topic, too. 
It should be mentioned, that in every high - level category (topic) more particular 
questions / opinions are concentrated. Answering of the questions and making of 
the soft-facts rating is usually a result of collaboration of key account manager / 
relationship manager / banker (which can be just different names for very similar 
positions in the banks) and the member of risk management team or Chief risk 
officer respectively. In all cases, the four-eye principle is kept, with respect to 
possible subjectivity of both involved persons, especially the key account manager 
/ relationship manager / banker (who usually gets benefit for every deal made).      
Anyway, the scheme shows apparently, that all the rating systems agree on some 
of the categories, but the similarity is lower than by quantitative indicators and the 
topics of the queries overlap only partially. The Table 3 shows the qualitative 
indicators of all three rating systems. 
Table 3 Qualitative indicators (soft-facts) 
 
Note: The numbers of weights are rounded. 
Source: Author' illustration based on banks “A”, “B” and “C” rating manuals. 
An interesting difference to mention is surely the category Relationship with the 
bank, which includes the period as well as the quality of the collaboration between 
the bank and the customer (thus the rated company). One of the rating systems 
take this indicator as the most important one with the weight of 40% (rounded), 
the second one uses this indicator with the 10% weight and the third one does not 
use this indicator at all (includes only problems in the relationship / previous 
collaboration with the customer as a warning signal, if existing). Even the later 
approach can make a good sense, considering the result of the rating process as a 
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universal transferable number (which can, but does not need to be relevant in this 
situation). If the indicator "Relationship with the bank" is not applicable (new client 
with no history in the bank), the weight is given at 0 and the weights of the 
remaining criteria are equally increased - e.g. in the bank A rating system all the 
remaining four qualitative indicators get the weight of 25% for a new client. 
Another noteworthy difference between the rating systems are the unique 
indicators of rating system “B”, concerning the divergence from company’s planning 
in last three years and the company’s business expectations including the bank’s 
own view and opinion to these expectations.        
3.5 Scales of Rating Results 
Concerning the scales used for the final rating result, the differences between the 
rating systems are rather unessential. This is hardly a surprise, if we take into 
consideration that all the rating systems have one common goal: to estimate the 
PD (probability of default) of particular customers of the bank between 0 and 100% 
for the following year. The rating systems also have to fulfill some given 
requirements in order to be accepted as a tool for counting the capital requirements 
of Basel II or Basel III respectively. 
On the high end of the scale, the banks A and B use rating grades 1-1 and 1-2 or 
1(AAAA) respectively for customers, who even do not have corresponding Moody’s 
rating and PD. The bank B describes this category as clients with „no credit risk at 
all”, which is rarely a real situation. The bank A uses the first two grades just for 
sovereigns and other banks, thus even the best rated company clients can only get 
the grade 1-3, which corresponds with best grade of Moody’s rating and real PD. 
Similar situation exists at the other two banks: the best company clients can reach 
he rating grade 1(AAA) or 1A respectively, but even such a result is more of 
theoretical case. 
On the lower end of the scale, all the banks use special grades for default clients, 
corresponding with Moody's grade C. The bank A uses as much as eight particular 
grades (8-1 to 8-8) for separate reason for default (like insolvency proceeding, 
overdue payments, restructuring etc.). An experienced user of the rating system 
can thus easily see the reason for the default grade of the rating. The bank B 
distinguishes three default grades (16, 17 and 18) by the estimated next progress 
of the client's situation. One grade represents the situation where the bank believes 
in possible recovery of the transaction after restructuring.  In the next grade the 
possible recovery is described as unlikely. The last grade is a definitive default of 
the transaction and the client, with no hope for recovery. The bank C use a method 
similar to bank A, but there are five grades of the default rating only. Another 
common feature for all three banks and their rating systems is, that the default 
rating grade (or more precisely any default grade) can be achieved only by existing 
risk factors (warning signals) or signs of default, but never by bad financial results 
or financial indicators only. The worst possible rating grade by financial statements 
only without any warning signals is 7 or 15 or 4E respectively.  
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The Table 4 shows the scales used by all three mentioned banks, compared with 
the Moody's rating scale.   
Table 4 The scales of rating results 
Rating A Rating B Rating C Moody's Indicative PD in 1 year 
1-1 
1 (AAAA) 
    
1-2     
1-3 
1(AAA) 
1A 
Aaa 
0.01% 
2-1 Aa1 
2-2 1(AA+) Aa2 0.02% 
2-3 1(AA) 1B Aa3 0.02 - 0.03% 
3-1 1(AA-) 1C A1 0.03% - 0.04% 
3-2 1(A+) 1D A2 0.05% - 0.06% 
3-3 
1(A) 1E 
A3 
0.07% - 0.08% 
1(A-) 2A 0.08% - 0.09% 
4-1 2 2B Baa1 0.1% 
4-2 
3 2C 
Baa2 0.1 - 0.2%  2D 
4 2E 
4-3 5 3A Baa3 0.2% - 0.5% 
5-1 6 3B Ba1 0.6% - 0.7% 
5-2 
7 
3C Ba2 0.8% - 1.6% 
8 
5-3 9 
3D 
Ba3 1.6% - 2.4% 
3E 
6-1 
10 
4A B1 2.4% - 5.4% 
11 
12 
4B B2 
5.4% - 12.2% 
6-2 13  
6-2 14 4C 
B3 12.2% - 17% 
  4D 
7 
15 4E 
Caa 1-3 
17% - 100% 
7 Ca 
8-1 - 8-8 
16 5A 
C Default 
 5B 
17 5C 
 5D 
18 5E 
Note: The PDs are rounded.  
Default (defined according to Basel II) = 90 days past due or unlikely to pay. 
Source: Author by using banks A, B and C rating manuals 
 
 
 
73 
Conclusions 
The result of the research shows, that the structures of compared bank’s internal 
rating systems are quite similar, based on integration of hard-facts rating based on 
quantitative indicators and soft-facts rating based on qualitative indicators, with 
possible additional steps according to the client (e.g. existing or non non-existing 
guarantor, external rating etc.). My conclusions about hard-facts part of credit 
rating systems are in line e.g. with the recent research of Weissova, Kollar and 
Siekelova (2015), who deal with the situation in Slovakia. 
Concerning the quantitative indicators (i), the highest emphasis is put on the capital 
structure of a company (whether in the form of Equity to Liabilities or Equity to 
Total assets) in all three compared rating systems. Cash Flow to Liabilities, Profit 
to Sales and Trade payables and Notes payable to Sales are other indicators used 
universally; the other indicators used for the calculation differ in the systems, as 
well as the total number of indicators (from 6 to 9). Most of the indicators 
mentioned here appear e.g. in the paper of Van Laere and Baesens (2010), 
concerning the rating systems in insurance branch. The relatively high similarity of 
the structures of compared bank’s internal rating systems as well as the of the 
hard-facts indicators corresponds to the results of Danielsson (2002) and 
Danielsson, Song Shin and Zigrand (2004), who, however, focused on models of 
market risk and on value-at-risk models (VaR). 
The size of the rated company is included under hard-facts calculation just in one 
of the three cases mentioned, where the more turnover the rated company makes, 
the more weight the hard-facts have in counting the final rating. Thus the size of 
the company is not a real hard - facts indicator and the mentioned rating systems 
in German-speaking environment currently do not reflect the Bakhtiari's (2017) 
conclusions about credit rating of firms in the USA, where the rating systems favour 
medium-sized productive firms and very large but not so productive companies. 
The relationship between the size of the company, the rating results and the real 
PD (especially in European area) can be seen as an interesting topic for following 
research.    
For soft-facts (ii) all rating systems agree on some of the basic categories (e.g. the 
quality of the management, market situation and sensitivity of the rated entity to 
market fluctuations etc.), but otherwise the number and the topics of the queries 
overlap only partially. 
My conclusions can be useful for any bank or financial institution, considering the 
development of their own credit rating system, investing in the purchase of an 
existing corporate rating solution or, where appropriate, improving or updating the 
rating system already in use. As other surveys like Jankowitsch, Pichler and 
Schwaiger (2007) show, investment in the rating system can bring not only a 
reduction in Basel's required capital held in the bank but also a reduction in credit 
losses.  
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